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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the policy effects of multilevel regulation in Europe. It finds that the extent 
to which negative integration effectively narrows the range of policy options available 
domestically tends to be overstated. Drawing on empirical evidence from EU-induced reform in 
electricity supply and postal delivery, the paper illustrates that liberalisation and institutional 
reorganisation may lead to relatively little policy change. Although a lack of centralised 
regulatory capacity at the European level is identified as a key explanatory factor for the cases 
studied, the findings also point to the relevance of sector specificities and the role of exogenous 
drivers of change.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Regulatory governance within the European Union (EU) has become a topical issue ever since 
Majone first introduced the notion of a ‘regulatory state’ (Majone 1994) in the mid-1990s. It 
points to a specific situation at EU-level where a restrictive budget forecloses comprehensive 
measures of (re)distribution. Instead, there has been a significant expansion of supranational rule-
making over time (Kohler-Koch et al. 2004; Thatcher 2001: 304; Majone 1994). The scope of 
centralised, supranational rule-making capacity however remains limited in the multi-level 
governance system of the EU, where supranational and national public actors as well as private 
actors engage in the formulation and implementation of rules. This contribution analyses 
regulation in the EU’s multi-level system from a governance perspective. The declared objective 
will be twofold: first, to capture the structure and actor constellations of multi-level governance 
and second, to assess its policy impact. The empirical focus of the paper is on regulatory 
governance and policy change in the electricity and postal sector.  
 
With the electricity and postal sector the paper looks at two politically sensitive cases which have 
been on the European reform agenda since the mid-1990s. Both sectors have gone through three 
difficult rounds of supranational policy-formulation, both of them have already been or are about 
to be fully opened to competition, and both have experienced substantial institutional reshuffling 
across levels of governance. Yet in substantial terms EU-induced policy change is rather limited, if 
not - speaking from a reformer’s perspective -, disappointing: in electricity competition is slow to 
emerge domestically, and market integration so far has only emerged at a regional scale; postal 
markets mainly function as national markets and achieved levels of end-to-end competition rarely 
pass the 10% margin. How can we explain this discrepancy between political reform agenda and 
policy realities? To what extent is the lack of policy change due to a lack of regulatory capacity at 
the European level? In what follows, I will first develop a conceptual framework of analysis and 
then go on to discuss key features of multi-level regulatory governance in the EU before presenting 
the two sector case studies.  
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2. Multilevel Regulatory Governance  
 
While there is widespread consensus on the rise of regulatory governance, assessing its policy 
effects is a challenging endeavour. Based on the general observation that liberalisation and 
privatisation reforms throughout the last decades have triggered several waves of “re-regulation” 
(Levi-Faur 2005; Héritier 2001: 848) rather than resulting in mere deregulation, regulatory 
governance has become a prominent theme in political science research in Europe (Lodge 2008). 
Given this widespread interest, it does not come as a surprise that central notions such as 
“regulation” and “governance” have been understood in very different ways. In the following 
sections I will first delineate the realm of regulatory governance, and then go on to consider 
specificities in the EU’s multilevel context. 
 
2.1. The realm of regulatory governance 
 
In order to capture the characteristics of this new governance paradigm, terms such as “regulatory 
state” (Majone 1994), “regulation inside government” (Hood et al. 1999), “regulatory society” 
(Braithwaite 2003), “post-regulatory state” (Scott 2004) and “regulatory capitalism” (Levi-Faur 
2005) have been coined. The underlying understanding of “regulation” is multi-faceted and the 
term has been defined in a myriad of ways. Generally speaking, a major distinction can be made 
between a broad, policy-oriented understanding of regulation and a narrower, actor-oriented 
definition of the term. In line with the typology established by Lowi (1964) “regulatory” policy 
refers to rule-setting activities by all types of actors which do not involve a (re)distribution of 
resources (Héritier 1987: 39). Such an encompassing use of the term is also at the basis of the 
famous ‘regulatory state’ hypothesis (Majone 1994), which has been of central importance to 
describe the emerging European order. By contrast, Selznick’s classical definition of regulation as 
“sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by the 
community” (Selznick 1985: 363) is more concise in terms of agency. In a similar vein, Levi-Faur 
has suggested to consider rule-setting “as regulation as long as they are not formulated directly by 
the legislature (primary law) or the courts (verdict, judgment, ruling and adjudication)” (Levi-Faur 
forthcoming 2011, chapter 1). Thus here regulation merely refers to the promulgation and 
execution of rules by administration, bureaucracies and private actors and excludes legislative or 
judicial rule making. 
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Both, the policy-oriented as well as the actor-oriented approach to regulation are relevant for 
this paper. Apprehending the effects of regulatory policy-making will be an incomplete 
exercise where rule-setting through the legislature is not being considered, given that the 
definition of the broad regulatory framework and the overarching policy objectives usually 
remains in the political arena. At the same time, the narrow understanding of regulation directs 
our attention to the role played by non-majoritarian and private actors outside the political 
arena. While administrative and bureaucratic actors engaging in regulation dispose of public 
authority in a concise area of regulatory activity, private actors may also take over regulatory 
tasks outside a delegated setting. Such regulatory, and often delegated, governance 
materializes in different forms, varying in terms of the public-private distinction and the level 
of organizational autonomy (Flinders 2008: 5). Focussing on the allocation of competencies 
between public and private actors, a basic distinction can be made between public regulation, 
where solely public actors are involved in rule-making, co-regulation, where public and 
private actors share rule-making capacity, and self-regulation, where solely private actors 
engage in rule-setting. Public regulation outside the legislature and judiciary is produced by 
administrative and bureaucratic bodies such as ministerial departments, executive agencies, 
non-ministerial departments, non-departmental bodies or central banks. Scholars and 
practitioners interested in their role and activity have been very creative in denominating them 
(Chester 1979), e.g. as  ‘non-majoritarian institutions’ (e.g. Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002), 
‘para-statal bodies’, ‘extra-governmental organisations’ or ‘quangos’ (Barker 1982). Co-
regulation constitutes a middle course where rules or policy objectives are being defined by a 
public authority, but are being complemented with regulatory detail, and also implemented by 
private actors. Such arrangements, which are thus characterized by joint decision-making with 
public actors have also been coined ‘regulated self-regulation’, ‘delegated self-regulation’ 
(Ronit and Schneider 2000: 23) or ‘negotiated agreements’ (OECD 1999: 18). While a co-
regulatory arrangement is characterised by shared responsibility, self-regulatory arrangements 
are characterised by a situation where regulator and regulatee coincide. Under pure self-
regulation, private organizations devise and manage their own rules without outside 
interference. Alternative terms which have been used to describe such arrangements are for 
instance ‘autonomous and voluntary regulation’ (Ronit and Schneider 2000: 23) or ‘unilateral 
commitment’ (OECD 1999: 16).  
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2.2. Regulation in the EU 
 
The conceptual framework for the empirical analysis of various settings of multi-level 
governance will be two-dimensional, integrating relevant actor constellations and levels of 
regulation (see table 1 below). The assessment of governance patters will rely on a narrow 
definition of regulation as rule-setting outside the legislator and judiciary. Besides the three 
categories of actor constellations described above (public regulation, co-regulation, self-
regulation based on a narrow definition of regulation), I suggest three categories of allocation 
of competencies. The first category is supranational regulation, where supranational actors 
hold direct rule-setting capacity. The second one is multi-level regulation, where public 
authority is spread across levels of governance. The third one is national regulation where 
rule-making capacity is exclusively residing at member state level. In areas where 
centralisation is strongly developed, supranational actors are in position to directly devise and 
enforce rules. Here the predominant mode of action is hierarchy (Börzel 2010: 198-200). 
Given that EU legislation can only be formulated as a result of successfully conducted 
negotiation, it most of the time introduces multi-level regulatory frameworks where the 
formulation of more detailed rules, and/ or their implementation are delegated towards lower 
levels of governance.  Also, areas which are of vital national interest may be completely left 
within the realm of national regulation. When combining the two dimensions, allocation of 
competencies across levels and actor constellations, we end up with nine basic settings of 
regulatory governance in the EU as laid out in the table below. 
 
Table 1 – Modes of regulatory governance in the EU 
level 
actors 
 
supranational multi-level national 
public supranational 
public regulation 
multi-level 
public regulation 
national 
public regulation 
 
public-private supranational 
co-regulation 
 
multi-level 
co-regulation 
national 
co-regulation 
private supranational 
self-regulation 
 
multi-level 
self-regulation 
national 
self-regulation 
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Different modes of regulation will not exist in isolation, but most of the time will combine as a 
governance mix with manifold effects of interaction. Due to the high capacity requirements for 
hierarchical steering, the scope of supranational regulation will necessarily be limited and 
notably not embrace all phases of the policy cycle. Multi-level regulation is thus very likely to 
combine with supranational regulation in many instances, notably where implementation tasks 
are being delegated towards lower levels of territorial governance. Regulatory powers and 
implementation tasks may further also be delegated towards the regulatees. Thus co- or self-
regulatory arrangements may combine with supranational regulation especially in sectors 
where regulatory design and/ or enforcement involve a high level of complexity or uncertainty. 
Even where there is no obvious or formal link between modes of regulation, these do not 
merely coexist. Rather, important effects of interaction can be expected. The possibility of 
supranational rule-making arrangements casting a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf 1993: 67) 
has been widely discussed in the literature on EU governance (e.g. Börzel 2010; Héritier and 
Lehmkuhl 2008). The underlying assumption is that the mere possibility of hierarchical 
intervention will significantly alter actor behaviour. Thus a credible threat to engage in 
centralized regulation may change the way in which multi-level regulation and national 
regulation, as well as co-regulation and self-regulation, are being executed. Finally, different 
patterns of interaction and evolution may be expected in a longitudinal perspective: there may 
be tendencies towards either centralisation or decentralisation, or hybrid solutions resulting in 
complex governance structures; actor-wise there may be empowerment of private or public 
actors, respectively, with trends such as agencification, emergence of network governance or 
the promotion of voluntary approaches. Thus the evolution of regulatory modes may go in all 
possible directions and is likely to result in complex and hybrid governance constellations. 
Combining possible levels of regulation and conceivable actor constellations, eight different 
evolution patterns may be discerned at the analytical level as indicated in the figure below. 
Several patterns of evolution may coexist at one point in time and in one policy area, and the 
status quo may be characterised by very different levels of stability. 
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Figure 1 – Evolution patterns of regulatory governance in the EU 
 
 
3. European Multi-level Regulatory Governance at Work 
 
In this section I will examine the allocation of competencies to regulatory actors and across 
levels of governance and thereby apply the conceptual framework in two areas of 
Europeanised sector regulation. With the electricity and postal sector the paper looks at two 
politically sensitive cases which have been on the European reform agenda since the mid-
1990s. Both sectors have gone through three difficult rounds of supranational policy-
formulation, both of them have already been or are about to be fully opened to competition, 
and both have experienced substantial institutional reshuffling across levels of governance. 
Each time I will briefly outline the main characteristics of sector regulation and its evolution 
over time in order to map the governance space in accordance with table 1. I will then provide 
detailed empirical evidence for this assessment following a public-private and national-
supranational continuum for the two dimensions. 
L
E
V
E
L 
ACTORS 
private public 
national 
EU 
towards national (1) or 
supranational regulation 
(2) 
towards private (3) or 
public regulation (4) 
towards national & public 
regulation (5) or  
supranat. & private 
regulation (6) 
towards national & self-
regulation (7) or 
supranat. & public 
regulation (8) 
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3.1. Private governance and multi-level regulation in electricity 
 
Liberalisation and regulatory reform in the electricity sector have been stipulated by European 
directives in 1996, 2003 and 2009. The first directive (1996/92/EC) launched market 
integration, while the second directive (2003/54/EC) granted all EU consumers the right to 
choose their electricity supplier not later than 2007. Institution-wise the introduction of 
independent regulators at national level has become mandatory with the second directive, and 
a process of incremental centralisation and formalisation of regulatory cooperation has led to 
the creation of an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and a European 
Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) with the third 
legislative package. The evolution of regulatory governance in the electricity sector can be 
described as a slow, yet continuous process towards more supranational regulation relying on 
public network governance as well as on private governance. Confining “regulation” to rule-
setting by either non-majoritarian or private actors, the current status quo is dominated by both 
multi-level public and co-regulation, as well as national public regulation (see table 2). 
Furthermore, it can be argued that there are elements of co-regulation at the national level and 
some elements of multi-level self-regulation. In what follows I will elaborate on the empirical 
findings which are at the basis of this assessment  
 
Table 2 – Modes of regulatory governance in electricity 
level 
actors 
 
supranational multi-level national 
public (ACER 2009) CEER 2000 
ERGEG 2003 
ACER 2009 
national regulators 
 
public/ 
private 
 Florence Forum 1998 
ETSO 1999/ERGEG, KOM 
ENTSO-E 2009/ACER, KOM 
national TSOs – 
national regulators 
private  UCTE 1951 
NORDEL 1963 
ETSO 1999 
 
 
The status quo prior to EU-induced institutional change was dominated by national legislative 
measures to regulate the sector (in the absence of independent sector regulators in most 
countries) at the national level, and aspects of multi-level self-regulation amongst network 
 8 
operators at the international level. So the first important move was the one towards public 
regulation (narrowly defined) at the national level, i.e. the delegation of regulatory tasks out of 
the political arena towards independent sector regulators. In the electricity sector the creation 
of a sector regulator has only become mandatory with the second directive, while the first 
directive allowed for non-regulated variants of access to the network in line with French and 
German concerns. This transfer of competencies was of course not adequate in order to address 
the emerging cross-border issues in the process towards an integrated energy market. Knowing 
that member states were not ready to transfer regulatory powers towards the supranational 
level, a first move of the Commission was to launch a process of informal coordination 
amongst public and private actors with the so-called “Florence Forum” established in 1998. 
The Forum convenes twice a year and brings together officials from national regulators, 
ministries and the European Commission as well as stakeholders from the industry alongside 
other interested parties. Being composed of public as well as private actors, the Forum 
resembles thus a co-regulatory arrangement, yet this process of “regulation through 
cooperation” (Cameron 2002: 283) was deprived of any formal rule-making capacity and thus 
purely based on voluntary cooperation (Eberlein 2003: 144). In practice the Forum failed to 
build consensus and conclude agreements (Héritier 2003: 122-123) in key areas such as cross-
border tariffication (Eberlein 2003: 147-148) which has ultimately been addressed by the 
introduction of secondary law (regulation EC no. 1228/2003).  
 
What this loose mechanism of multi-level co-regulation has generated, though, were first 
organisational structures to facilitate cooperation amongst national regulators and national 
TSOs, respectively. National regulators created a Council for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (CEER) in 2000. The CEER is based on a non-legal memorandum of 
understanding, has no formal regulatory powers and is financed by contributions from the 
national authorities. To strengthen transnational cooperation, national regulators have been 
mandated with formal powers when a European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas 
(ERGEG, created by COM decision 2003/796 EC) was created in the context of the second 
legislative package. As in other sectors the informal network CEER has continued to coexist 
alongside the official advisory body to allow for cooperation outside the official mandate. 
With the third legislative package ERGEG has been replaced by an “Agency for the 
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Cooperation of Energy Regulators” (ACER, created by regulation EC no. 713/2009). The 
denomination of this new body already reveals that we do not witness the emergence of a EU 
energy regulator proper speaking. Rather, ACER is a networked body which strongly relies on 
national regulators. The director of ACER is supposed to follow the opinions provided by 
ACER’s Bord of Regulators which is composed of senior representatives of the National 
Regulatory Authorities and one representative of the Commission who has no voting right.1 
This being said, the body will constitute a small nucleus of supranational regulation with a 
team of around 40 EU officials being at its disposal. By contrast, the new Body of European 
Regulators of Electronic Communications (BEREC, created by EC regulation no. 1221/2009) 
is an even more hybrid organisation which disposes of some supranational secretariat but 
otherwise relies on its national members.2 Although ACER disposes of relatively few 
regulatory powers and is a small entity compared to regulatory capacity at the national level, 
there is overall a trend towards supranational public regulation. 
 
The interesting thing in the energy sector is that this trend towards centralised public 
regulation combines with a trend towards supranational co-regulation. The third directive 
(2009/72/EC) and the amended regulation on cross-border trade (EC no. 714/2009) formalise 
the role of TSO cooperation within the newly created ENTSO-E and attribute important co-
regulatory powers to the network operators. This evolution has not been uncontroversial, 
raising the question whether they become too much of a “network regulator” while at the same 
time operating this central infrastructure facility. Seen from the past record of TSO 
cooperation, however, the emerging governance regime at the European level appears only 
consequential. TSOs in Europe out of technical necessity have been co-operating across 
borders long before national regulatory authorities and European regulation have been 
introduced in the sector. The Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity 
(UCTE) in Central Western Europe, for instance, dates back to 1951. NORDEL, which is the 
UCTE’s equivalent for the Nordic countries, exists since 1963. After the introduction of the 
first legislative package at the European level and the launch of market integration national 
                                                          
1
 ACER’s internal governance is assured by an Administrative Board, dispute settlement is in the hands of its Board 
of Appeal. See ACER’s website at www.energy-regulator.eu (last access 23.02.2011). 
2
 For more information see BEREC’s website at www.erg.eu.int (last access 23.02.2011). 
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TSOs started to organise at the European level within their new organisation European 
Transmission System Operators (ETSO) from 1999 onwards. In 2001, ETSO became an 
international association with direct membership of 32 independent TSO companies from the 
15 EU member countries plus Norway and Switzerland. Since then, it has subsequently been 
enlarged to the TSOs of East and South East European countries. In the absence of public 
regulation addressing certain issues, TSOs for many years have resolved cross-border issues 
through self-regulation within their organisation. One such area of self-regulatory activity 
within ETSO was the negotiation of voluntary agreements on Inter-TSO-Compensation for 
cross-border flows since 2002. 
 
3.2. The predominance of national regulation in the postal sector 
 
European secondary law in the postal sector dates from 1997, 2002 and 2008. Whilst only 
timid first steps to reduce the scope of national legal monopolies were taken in the first 
directive (1997/67/EC), the second directive (2002/39/EC) introduced intermediary steps, and 
a date for full liberalisation was finally set in the third directive (2008/6/EC). Institution-wise 
the postal market until very recently formed an exception in the European governance 
architecture as no formal body for the cooperation of national regulators had been introduced. 
In the context of implementing the third postal directive, however, a European Regulators 
Group for Postal Services (ERGP) has been established (Commission decision 2010/C 
217/07). Compared to the electricity sector, governance dynamics in the postal sector are even 
slower and more incremental. Apart from setting the broad regulatory framework through 
European secondary law, regulation mainly resides at the national level and the trend towards 
multi-level cooperation through a governance network of national regulators is a very recent 
one.  Thus overall the governance mix in the postal sector is characterised by far less variation 
in comparison to electricity regulation as illustrated by the table below. 
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Table 3 - Modes of regulatory governance in the postal sector 
level 
actors 
 
supranational multi-level national 
public  ERGP (2010) 
[CERP (1959)] 
national regulators 
 
public-private  CEN 
 
 
private   
 
 
 
Similarly to the energy and other network industries, the status quo prior to EU-induced 
institutional change was dominated by national legislative measures in the absence of regulation 
through non-majoritarian bodies. Due to centralised service provision the postal operators across 
Europe usually formed part of their respective ministry. As a result one single body fulfilled both 
operative and regulatory tasks without them being structurally separated. This had to change once 
the first European directive required that “each Member State shall designate one or more 
national regulatory authorities for the postal sector that are legally separate from and 
operationally independent of the postal operators” (article 22 of directive 1997/67/EC). This 
being said, European secondary law leaves ample leeway to the member states when it comes to 
the actual institutional design of these bodies and notably the independence from their parent 
ministries.  
 
Compared to other sectors the role of national bodies in regulatory governance at the European 
level is insignificant. For a long time the only formalised involvement of national regulators was 
within the Comitology procedure. The so-called postal directive committee, which follows the 
regulatory committee (IIIa) procedure, is composed of member state and Commission 
representatives. However, national governments could call on their regulators to participate and 
give input. In practice, the postal committee proved to be a forum aiming at disseminating 
information rather than a decision-making body. This is a major difference in comparison to the 
electricity sector, where a number of implementation measures were subject to agreement in 
Comitology. Another peculiarity was the non-existence of a formalised body facilitating 
cooperation amongst national regulatory bodies. In the absence of such a network governance 
structure, regulators continued to cooperate informally within the intergovernmental group that 
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predates the European reform process, the Committee of European Postal Regulators (CERP). 
CERP is the sectoral branch of the European Conference for Telecommunications and Posts 
(CEPT).3 Established in 1959, CEPT was originally constituted by the monopoly-holding postal 
and telecommunications administrations. Once the operators created their own, sector-specific 
organisations in 1992 (PostEurop for the postal sector), and once EU law prescribed the 
separation between operational and regulatory functions for the two sectors, the tasks of CEPT 
had been redefined. Firstly, CEPT became a body of policy-makers and regulators which would 
no longer deal with operational issues. Secondly, to respond to the substantial separation between 
the sectors, CEPT established three committees: CERP for postal matters and two others to deal 
with electronic communications issues (European Radiocommunications Committee, ERC and 
European Committee for Regulatory Telecommunications Affairs, ECTRA). Another 
development was to expand the scope of geographical coverage. Central and Eastern European 
Countries became eligible for membership, and today CEPT is composed of 48 countries. As a 
consequence of its history, CERP is composed of both, ministry representatives and postal 
regulators. The CERP member countries can choose whether they send ministry representatives, 
regulators, or both. Some CERP countries have not established NRAs, so they will obviously 
send ministry representatives.  
 
While the first two directives did not even touch upon the issue, the third directive emphasised 
the need for “close cooperation” and “mutual assistance” (article 22 of 2008/6/EC) between 
national regulators, but did not introduce any institutional innovation in this respect. Only in the 
context of implementing the third directive and full, EU-wide market opening by January 2011 
did this situation change. Based on a study providing further evidence for the need for closer 
cooperation (WIK-Consult 2009) and two high-level conferences bringing together key actors in 
European postal regulation4, the Commission eventually came to the decision to introduce a 
formal body for the cooperation of postal regulators. The European Regulators Group for Post 
(ERGP) was established on 10 August 2010 and held its first meeting on 1 December 2010, 
electing its first chair person and adopting its rules of procedure (ERGP (10) 2). It is composed of 
                                                          
3
 Website at www.cept.org  (last access 11.05.2009). 
4
 Documentation of these meetings can be found at the Commission’s internal market website on postal services, 
available at www.ec.euopra.eu/internal_market/post/conference_en.htm (last access 13.09.2010). 
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the heads of the national regulators and disposes of a secretariat provided by the European 
Commission. Besides facilitating consultation, coordination and cooperation between national 
authorities, ERGP is supposed to develop best regulatory practice and to function as an expert 
advisor to the European Commission.5  
 
4. The Policy Effects of Multi-level Regulation 
 
When looking at substantial reform outcomes, the surprising news is that change is rather 
limited, if not - speaking from a reformer’s perspective -, disappointing: in electricity 
competition is slow to emerge domestically, and market integration so far has only emerged at 
a regional scale; postal markets mainly function as national markets and achieved levels of 
end-to-end competition rarely pass the 10% margin. The following sections will seek to 
explore the extent to which multi-level regulatory governance in these sectors accounts for 
policy outcomes. In so doing alternative explanatory factors such as sector specificities and 
exogenous determinants of change will be considered. 
 
4.1. The long road to market integration in the energy sector 
 
Policy objectives in the Energy sector are manifold, yet interrelated and often not easy to 
reconcile. The three key challenges for the EU’s policy are the realisation of the internal energy 
market, security of supply and environmental sustainability. In this paper I will focus on progress 
towards achieving the first objective. In view of the current status quo it is adequate to 
distinguish between competition at the member state level on the one hand, and progress towards 
market integration on the other hand.  
 
Although electricity markets according to the second directive were deemed to be fully open no 
later than 2007, actual competition is slow to develop in most member states. The Commission in 
its most recent communication on progress in the sector dated 11 March 2010 (COM (2010) 84 
final) reported high levels of concentration both in electricity wholesale and retail markets. For 
                                                          
5
 ERGP does not yet dispose of its own web presence. Most updated information can be found at the Commission’s 
DG internal market website on postal services at www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/post/news_en.htm (last access 
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instance, the market share of the three largest companies in the retail market transgressed the 
80% margin in 14 member states (ebd.: 7). Detailed findings on concentration and market power 
had already been generated in the course of the Commission’s sector inquiry which was 
conducted between 2005 and 2007 (COM (2006) 851 final: 5; SEC (2006) 1724, 10 January 
2007, part 2: 115-134). Speaking for the situation in Germany, the Federal Cartel Office has 
backed up such findings in its sector inquiry published last month.6 The data illustrates that the 
four big players on the German electricity market (RWE, E.ON, Vattenfall and EnBW) continue 
to control about 80% of the first-time sales market. Based on the observation that these providers 
appear to be indispensible for covering electricity demand, the competition authority concludes 
that they factually dispose of a dominant position in the German market. In the analysis of the 
reasons for these unsatisfactory market outcomes institutional arrangements and governance 
issues have been addressed notably when it comes to the enforcement action by national 
authorities (COM (2010) 84 final: 2). One of the motives for the Commission to launch 
infringement proceedings in June 2009 against 25 member states for non-compliance with the 
second electricity directive was that national regulators lacked effective means of penalties to 
sanction violations with European law (IP/09/1035; COM (2010) 84 final: 10). Besides effective 
regulatory oversight, the industry structure and notably vertical integration has been found to be a 
significant impediment for change (COM 2006 851 final: 6; SEC (2006) 1724, 10 January 2007, 
part 2: 135-149). The Commission concluded from its sector inquiry that vertical integration of 
supply and network reduces the network operators’ incentives to grant access to their 
infrastructure to third parties, and that legal unbundling was not sufficient to address the issue. It 
thus made ownership unbundling a cornerstone of the proposal for the third electricity directive 
(COM 2007 (528) final). Strengthened by an unprecedented synergy between its double role as 
an agenda setter of European legislation and as the supranational competition authority (as 
discussed by Eikeland 2011), the Commission nevertheless failed to impose ownership 
unbundling on the member states. The legislative output (directive 2009/72/EC chapters IV and 
V) allows for three unbundling options, i.e. ownership unbundling proper speaking, the 
Commission’s compromise proposal to introduce an independent system operator (ISO), and 
                                                          
6
 Bundeskartellamt (2011): Sektoruntersuchung Stromerzeugung Stromgroßhandel. Bericht gemäß §32e Abs. 3 
GWB, Januar 2011 (B 10-9/09). Downloadable from the Federal Cartel Office’s website at 
www.bundeskartellamt.de (last access 22.02.2011).  
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finally the ‘third way’ pet solution of France and Germany to introduce independent transmission 
operators (ITO).7  
 
Similarly to competition at the domestic level, market integration has developed at a very slow 
pace if at all. After more than two decades of supranational legislation market integration at a 
European scale has not emerged, and what we see is the coexistence of national markets besides 
achievements at a regional scale. The demand for interconnector capacity at many borders has 
increased and often exceeds available capacity (SEC (2006) 1724, 10 January 2007, part 2: 152). 
According to the Commission empirical evidence points to a situation where there is a lack of 
incentives to a) use existing capacity efficiently, and b) to invest in new interconnector capacity 
(ebd.: 153-165). With respect to the use of existing capacity, congestion management is of 
pivotal importance. So far very different methods in managing congestion have coexisted across 
Europe, while supranational governance set a general framework without detailed prescriptions. 
First principles were laid down in the Annex of Regulation 1228/2003 where it was stipulated 
that network congestion shall be addressed with non-discriminatory market based solutions and 
non-transaction based methods. This Annex has been substituted by “Guidelines on the 
management and allocation of available transfer capacity of interconnections between national 
systems” in 2006 (2006/770/EC), agreed upon by Comitology procedure. The Guidelines state 
that capacity shall be allocated only by means of explicit or implicit auctions. It further prescribes 
how the NRAs shall monitor the use made by TSOs of congestion income, yet it does not 
establish a hierarchy between the three options: investment in existing infrastructure, construction 
of new lines, lowering the tariff. So far the multi-level governance has maintained the TSO’s 
autonomy for their zones. This leaves TSOs with leeway to manage congestion to their 
advantage, i.e. to generate extra profit by shifting congestion. There is a similar difficulty to 
tackle the second challenge, the construction of new cross-border capacity. Not only is there a 
lack of willingness from market actors to engage in long-term and costly infrastructure 
investment, in addition long and cumbersome authorisation procedures at the local level hamper 
the swift construction of new lines. The latter problem was tackled in the context of the ‘Priority 
                                                          
7
 FAZ 07.06.2008: „Rat einig über Grundsätze der Energieentflechtung“, available at www.faz.net (last access 
22.02.2011); Le Monde 21.05.2008: „Paris et Berlin refusent de scinder la production et le transport d'énergie“, 
www.lemonde.fr (last access 22.02.2011).  
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Interconnection Plan’ (COM 2006 846 final) which identified a few cross-border projects and 
assigned high-level coordinators in order to increase visibility and bring the authorisation process 
forward.  
 
Overall it seems that the European governance regimes was probably “too fragmented to 
guarantee the establishment of a rational European network” (Bjørnebye 2006: 334). The third 
legislative package will enhance regulatory capacity on cross-border issues, but it is yet to be 
seen whether the new governance arrangements will be sufficient to bring about meaningful 
change. The new legislation introduces binding, EU-wide network codes which are to be 
developed by the transmission system operators, based on framework guidelines formulated by 
ACER. To ensure infrastructure investment, transmission system operators furthermore have to 
agree on EU-wide ten-year network development plans, on which ACER will give an opinion.  
 
4.2. Return to sender? Liberalisation in the postal sector 
 
As it was stated in the most recent report commissioned by the Directorate General Internal 
Market and Services (Olkholm et al. 2010: 12), the three main themes in the postal sector are the 
Universal Service Obligation (USO), labour market issues and competition. Arguably European 
legislation has put most emphasis on creating a competitive market and guaranteeing the USO 
through regulatory means, whereas labour market issues are exclusively dealt with at the 
domestic level. Therefore, and in analogy to the analysis of electricity regulation, I will mainly 
focus on competition and consider USO regulation solely inasmuch as it affects market 
dynamics. This being said, there is not much point to differentiate between competition at the 
domestic level, and market integration at the European level, since the postal business still very 
much functions in terms of national markets. 
 
Most updated empirical evidence on the situation in EU postal markets leads to the conclusion 
that competition develops very slowly if at all, and that incumbent operators continue to be 
dominant players in the letter post segment (Olkholm et al. 2010: 80). Even among the 
“frontrunners in Europe” the level of competition rarely goes beyond the 10% threshold in the 
market for addressed letter mail (ECORYS 2008: 114-117; WIK-Consult 2004: 94): Sweden is 
fully open to competition since 1993, yet new entrants have not achieved much more than 9% of 
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mail volume by 2007; the UK abolished the reserved area in 2006, yet Royal Mail still dominates 
the market with close to 100% in mail delivery8; regulation for competition in Germany by the 
end of 2007 has generated a market share of above 10% in the licensed area (Bundesnetzagentur 
2008: 24); the highest shares have been achieved by Spain (approximately 12%) and the 
Netherlands (14%); 
 
To what extent can this absence of market dynamics be retraced to regulatory governance issues? 
Member states enjoy ample leeway in their choice of sector-specific regulatory regimes when it 
comes to key regulatory issues such as the institutional design and competencies of national 
regulators, licencing regimes and the scope of the USO. Speaking about institutional 
arrangements, it appears that the shift towards non-majoritarion “regulation” proper speaking has 
been very limited. Key decisions remain in the realm of the legislator and only in a few countries 
(Czeck Republik, Denmark, Slovenia and the UK) can the regulators decide on major 
determinants of the regulatory framework (WIK-Consult 2006: 110). Even then, the introduction 
of an independent regulator has been delayed in many countries leading to proceedings for non-
compliance with the requirement of structural separation (IP/01/1139). By today Italy is the only 
country which has not introduced an independent regulator, while regulatory independence 
continues to be challenged in many member states (Olkholm et al. 2010: 15). Institutional 
arrangements concerning statutory independency vary significantly across countries. Issues such 
as appointment rules of agency heads (in Ireland and the UK by postal minister), the lack of fixed 
terms (Estonia and Finland) or a relatively short term of office (Malta, Sweden, UK) gave reason 
for concern (WIK-Consult 2006: 19). Also, the range of responsibilities diverges significantly 
across member states (WIK-Consult 2006: 110). Similar variation can be observed when it comes 
to substantive regulatory choices. The scope of authorisation regimes, for instance, has been 
defined very differently across countries (Campbell et al. 2008: 202-205; ECORYS 2008: 57-61). 
The Netherlands and the Czech Republic have not introduced authorisation requirements, other 
countries operate with general authorisations (Austria, Denmark Ireland, Slowenia and 
Slowakia), or with different authorisation categories (Germany, France, Poland, Sweden and the 
UK) and another group of countries requires authorisation for all services which fall under the 
                                                          
8
 According tot he UK regulator’s figures for 2007/2008, see http://www.psc.gov.uk/index.html 
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USO. The requirements to be fulfilled in order to obtain authorisation are sometimes quite 
demanding and may constitute a barrier to entry (Campbell et al. 2008: 204). Being a cornerstone 
of postal regulation, scope and coverage of the USO are a key determinant for emerging 
competition. Variation is again significant (Campbell et al. 2008: 198; ECORYS 2008: 47-48). 
The inclusion of letters and parcels is standard in all countries, whilst only half of them include 
the delivery of newspapers and periodicals. Decisive for the volume of mail subject to the USO is 
whether or not bulk mail forms part of it. So far, Spain and the Netherlands have excluded the 
latter from the USO. Bulk mail is part of the universal service in Austria, the Czech Republic, 
France, Italy, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia. Among those countries with the broadest scope of 
the USO in terms of services included figure Denmark, France and Portugal. In many member 
states the services delivered under the USO are furthermore exempt from VAT.9  
 
A brief comparison of potential explanatory factors in the “frontrunning” countries points to the 
relevance of regulatory regimes, understood in a wide sense including the regulatory framework 
set by the legislator. The high level of competition in Spain which has been achieved ahead of 
full market opening was mainly due to the scope of the reserved area, which excluded domestic 
intra-city and bulk mail. Also, the VAT exemption of the incumbent was limited to the reserved 
area. Beyond that, the relatively poor quality of the services delivered by the national post office 
has certainly helped new entrants to gain ground. As a consequence, a large number of small 
local and regional private operators is active on the Spanish market (ECORYS 2008, country 
sheet summaries: 115). The Netherlands exhibit similar features of a rather lean, pro-competitive 
regulatory environment: printed matter is not reserved, and the VAT exemption for the 
incumbent is also limited to the reserved area. Overall the Dutch market is being characterised as 
„relatively open“ characterised by „little regulatory interference“ (ECORYS 2008, country sheet 
summaries: 87). By contrast, the Swedish market was characterised by a decline in mail volumes. 
Entry into the market is legally speaking relatively easy, yet the main competitor CityMail 
initially faced many difficulties which have partly been resolved by settling disputes with the 
incumbent concerning the access regime (ECORYS 2008, country sheet summaries: 87). In the 
UK the most obvious competitive advantage for Royal Mail was the VAT exemption applicable 
                                                          
9
 Based on Council Directive 77/388/EC of 17 May 1977 (amended by a new directive 2006/112/EEC) on the 
harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes, which exempts postal services from VAT. 
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for all services, in all other respects the regulatory regime seems fairly balanced (ECORYS 2008, 
country sheet summaries: 123). An exogenous factor which is specific to the sector is density of 
population which has a significant impact on operators’ cost structures. Here the Dutch case 
would hint to the fact that ultimately population density is decisive for competition to emerge. 
The Netherlands has the highest population density in the EU with 394 inhabitants per km² 
(ECORYS 2008, country sheet summaries: 89). With Germany another liberalisation frontrunner 
figures amongst the most densely populated countries of the EU. Sweden, counting 20 
inhabitants per km² (ECORYS 2008, country sheet summaries: 121) as well as the UK, with a 
population density above average but many areas with difficult accessibility, would further fit 
into the picture: here the reserved area has been abolished, but the degree of competition on the 
market is still low. Spain, by contrast, has achieved a relatively high degree of competition 
despite exhibiting low population density (87 inhabitants per km²) which is unequally dstributed 
over the country (ECORYS 2008, country sheet summaries: 117).  
 
At this stage it appears that cooperation amongst national authorities could mainly be aimed at 
harmonising regulatory practices across the EU. In its work programme for 2011-2012 (ERGP 
(10) 05), ERGP identifies several priorities in this respect, such as giving an opinion on how to 
calculate the net cost of the Universal Service Obligation and delivering reports on issues related 
to accounting, price and access regulation.   
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper I have sought to examine the policy effects of multilevel regulation in Europe from a 
governance lens. To that end I have developed a conceptual framework based on a dual 
distinction between levels of regulation and actor constellations, generating nine possible options 
of non-majoritarian and private regulation in the EU. Considering the evolution of EU regulatory 
governance over time, I have argued that manifold trends may combine, resulting in different 
levels and actor constellations being involved. This conceptual framework was then used to 
compare regulatory governance and its policy effects in the electricity and postal sector. It 
appeared from empirical evidence that both network specificities and prevalent market structures 
have complicated market creation and integration alongside governance arrangements in the 
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electricity sector. There was clearly a regulatory gap on cross-border issues related to market 
integration, but regulatory oversight also proved difficult at the national level. The third 
legislative package seeks to address some of these deficiencies by strengthening regulatory 
cooperation within a newly created European agency and by formalising private governance 
through network operators. In the postal sector there is no such regulatory gap in the absence of a 
pressing need to cooperate across borders in order to foster domestic competition and market 
integration. Empirical evidence however points to a situation where domestic legislation and 
regulation may impede rather than foster competition. This comes in addition to sector 
specificities such as dropping mail volumes and important economies of scale which in 
themselves have negative consequences for levels of competition. In the context of implementing 
the third postal directive we currently see the emergence of formalised cooperation among postal 
regulators which is deemed to overcome regulatory obstacles to market creation and achieve 
some regulatory harmonisation in this respect. 
 
With the electricity and postal sector the paper has looked at two examples where the EU’s 
declared policy objective of creating an internal market has so far not been achieved. The 
underlying governance arrangements and their evolution vary significantly across the two areas: 
in electricity we see a complex mix of governance across levels in which private actors play a 
pivotal role; in the postal sector there is a predominance of national legislation and regulation and 
no formal involvement of private actors; in electricity there is clearly a trend towards more 
supranational regulation, which is however accompanied by a second trend towards co-
regulation; in the postal sector the trend towards more supranational regulation for a long time 
was absent, and with the creation of the EPRG today is in its infancy; Such evidence has two 
more general implications with respect to multi-level governance and its effects in the EU. First, 
there is not a single trend of evolution over time, so that different modes coexist and develop 
incrementally. Thus the multi-layered and polycentral structure of European regulatory 
governance is here to stay. Second, the extent to which negative integration effectively narrows 
the range of policy options available domestically tends to be overstated. The paper illustrates 
that EU-induced liberalisation and institutional reorganisation may lead to relatively little policy 
change. Although a lack of centralised regulatory capacity at the European level is identified as a 
 21 
key explanatory factor for the cases studied, the findings also point to the relevance of sector 
specificities and the role of exogenous drivers of change.  
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